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Abstract
This paper considers the mutually beneficial relationship of German and Austrian for-
eign direct investment (FDI) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) between 2004 and 
2007, and the impact that the CEE states' belated membership in the Schengen Area had on 
further economic integration. It analyzes how excluding CEE member states from immedi-
ate membership in the Schengen Area upon their accession to the EU in 2004 and 2007 
affected the economies of Germany, Austria, and the CEE member states. The paper argues 
that, in reviewing actual FDI and migration numbers following EU enlargements, fears over 
the potentially negative effects of labor migration from the New Member States (NMS-
10) to the original “old EU-15” members were largely unwarranted. Rather, German and 
Austrian FDI in CEE created a mutually beneficial relationship between the regions, the 
potential for which was not fully realized until imposed barriers—like delayed Schengen 
membership—were finally removed.
Keywords
FDI, Schengen Agreement, EU Enlargement, Economic Integration, Germany, Aus-
tria, CEE
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Introduction
Since the fall of Communism in 1989, Central and Eastern European (CEE)1 states 
have come to view European integration as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
European integration has led to swift economic growth and benefits for the region, includ-
ing increased amounts of incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) and internal economic 
development (Bevan & Estrin, 2004, p. 785). On the other hand, European integration has 
presented significant challenges in terms of broader political and social integration. Wood 
(2003) writes: “Support for international economic liberalization, which is hardly univer-
sal, is not necessarily accompanied by inclination to political integration and wide-ranging 
sociocultural interaction and change” (p. 303). The contradictory nature of European in-
tegration has impacted both economic and political institutions within Europe. Jacoby and 
Meunier (2010) suggest that, “European integration has been seen as an effort to manage 
the eroding powers of national states, to manage the creation of an integrated market, and 
to manage the ‘pooling’ of national sovereignty” (p. 304). This paper examines how Ger-
man and Austrian FDI in CEE illustrates the benefits and challenges of European economic 
integration. In spite of the regions’ current complementary relationship, this case epitomizes 
the inefficient and drawn-out process of breaking down barriers that stand in the way of 
complete economic integration. 
This integrative process began with the fall of Communism, which presented a myriad 
of opportunities for European integration.2 For numerous reasons, CEE states were seen 
as a place of great potential for future European economic investment and for political in-
tegration into the European Union (EU) and its institutions. The two countries from the 
EU-153 quickest to capitalize on the possibilities offered by the CEE block—due in large 
part to their geographic and strategic locations—were Austria and Germany (Marin, 2010, 
p. 1). Though Germany and Austria stood to gain politically from their eastern neighbors’ 
integration with Western Europe, their most obvious potential gains were economic. These 
economic motivations are the primary focus in this paper.4 Today, more than one third of 
Austrian European investments are in CEE states, while Germany’s share of FDI in CEE has 
increased from 7 % to 11 % from 2000 to 2011 (Medve-Bálint, 2014, p. 47). This has made 
Germany the “single largest investor and trading partner with the countries of East-Central 
Europe” (Gross, 2013, p. 26). 
The potential economic prospects existing in the post-communist CEE states have 
created a complementary relationship for Germany and Austria. Because of this comple-
mentarity, it would seem that Austria and Germany would be in favor of further integration. 
However, this has not always been the case. Throughout their economic involvement in the 
CEE, Austria and Germany—in an effort to safeguard their prominent market positions—
1	 	CEE	 states	 include	Bulgaria,	 the	Czech	Republic,	Estonia,	Hungary,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	 Poland,	Romania,	
Slovakia,	and	Slovenia.	These	ten	countries,	as	well	as	Cyprus	and	Malta,	make	up	the	NMS-12.	The	NMS-10	
excludes	Bulgaria	and	Romania,	who	joined	two	years	later	in	2007.	Additionally,	CEE	is	often	abbreviated	as	
CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries) or ECE (Eastern and Central Europe). 
2	 	This	paper	defines	European	integration	as	cooperation	on	a	European	level	through	the	formal	processes	of	
the	European	Union	(EU).	This	includes	participation	in	the	single	market	prior	to	EU	membership	and	efforts	to	
extend membership in various institutions of the EU to CEE countries.
3	 	The	EU-15	refers	to	those	member	countries	comprising	the	EU	prior	to	the	2004	enlargements.	
4	 	In	no	way	should	this	paper	be	read	as	denigrating	the	importance	of	political	ties	to	the	CEE	states.	Recent	
events in Ukraine serve as a reminder that political cooperation in the region is extremely important for both 
Germany	and	Austria.
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have repeatedly erected barriers that have actually undermined the very relationships they 
were trying to foster. This is evident in the instances of Austrian and German trade and labor 
discrimination that are documented by Bandelj and Jacoby. 
Perhaps less obvious is the connection between Austrian and German FDI in CEE and 
the barriers to labor mobility caused by delaying the membership of the CEE New Member 
States (NMS-10) in the EU Schengen Agreement. Scholarship has had little to say on the 
correlation between the Schengen Agreement and Austrian and German FDI in the CEE 
states. But at the time of EU enlargement, conscious decisions to withhold Schengen Area 
membership from CEE states had a significant impact on the region’s relationship with its 
neighbors. The NMS-10 regarded these barriers as emblematic of second-class citizenship. 
Despite the gains to be had from European integration, the decision to erect barriers by 
delaying Schengen membership demonstrates that the road to complementarity between 
Austria, Germany and the CEE states has not been a quick or easy achievement.
This paper discusses the potential reasons why the economic and political benefits of a 
relationship between these regions were delayed. The analysis is divided into seven sections. 
The first section introduces the Schengen Agreement and why it should not be overlooked 
as a barrier to complementarity. The second section gives a brief history of German and 
Austrian FDI in the CEE states following the fall of Communism. The third section assesses 
the attitudes of Germany, Austria and the CEE states prior to EU enlargement. The fourth 
section considers the fears surrounding accession negotiations, and the fifth section addresses 
the policy responses to those fears. The sixth section observes what occurred during the EU 
enlargements from 2004 to 2007. The seventh and final section is the conclusion. 
The Schengen Agreement
Today, Austria, Germany, and CEE are economically integrated to a significant ex-
tent. One might wonder, then, why the Austrians and Germans insisted on delaying the 
membership of CEE states in the Schengen Agreement. To better understand this, one must 
first consider what membership in the Schengen Agreement implies. Named after a quaint 
village in Luxembourg where the contract was signed, the Schengen Agreement is known 
primarily for its efforts to eradicate internal borders and strengthen external borders within 
the area of its member countries. This has allowed 420 million people within Europe “to 
move freely across the internal borders” of the participating areas (Malmström, 2013). In 
2009, the European Commission reported that EU citizens and non-EU nationals averaged 
a combined total of 12.6 million crossings of EU external borders per week (European 
Commission, Migration and Asylum, 2013, p. 4). With such frequent traveling of persons 
and the removal of custom controls inside the area, the results of the Schengen Agreement 
have become “…one of the things that the EU citizens appreciate most in the EU” (Malm-
ström, 2013). Yet for all of the good that the Schengen Agreement has brought about, it has 
also caused much controversy and stoked heated discussions. 
At the heart of the issue is the fact that participation in the Schengen Agreement is not 
all-inclusive. In spite of EU enlargement from 2004 to 2007, the NMS-10 countries, ex-
cluding Cyprus, were only granted membership in the Schengen Area in 2007. Even now, 
Bulgaria and Romania have been continually denied membership on the basis of “capac-
ity deficits,” while Cyprus was denied because of issues with the “partition of [its] island” 
(Lavenex, 2010, p. 462). Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus and—at an earlier point—the other 
CEE states have been frustrated by this exclusion. Rather than uniting the new member 
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1 0 6 
states, it differentiates them. Thus, the Schengen Agreement has had “…a direct impact on 
perceptions of European integration and on the circles of inclusion and exclusion being 
drawn by the enlargement process” (Grabbe, 2000, p. 527-528). These feelings of alienation 
have created contention between the EU-15 and the NMS-10.
Recent controversies over future enlargement within the Schengen Area have brought 
to light the difficulty for newer EU member states working to meet the stipulations of 
the Schengen acquis.5 Although the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), adopted in 1997 and 
implemented in 1999, made the Schengen acquis a required part of the framework for EU 
membership (Council of the European Union, 2004-2013), those member states that joined 
the EU in 2004 acceded after only partial provisions of the Schengen requirements were 
in place, delaying complete membership until 2007 (EU Council, 2007, p. 6). From 2004 
until 2007, when the majority of those states acceding in 2004 joined the Schengen Area, 
several member states restricted the freedom of citizens from CEE to live and work in the 
“old EU-15.” Yet ironically, many of the EU-15 member states that opposed the immediate 
membership of newly acceded CEE countries were simultaneously investing in CEE labor 
markets—Germany and Austria being two of the leading cases. 
The Schengen Agreement most directly relates to this paper because of its connection 
to labor mobility. Because the Schengen Agreement increases the relative ease for people 
to travel throughout the EU, it promotes a heightened fluidity of labor force mobility 
throughout Europe. The European Commission has recognized the necessity of this labor 
migration “in driving [EU] economic development and in addressing the [labor] and skills 
shortages and demographic challenges [the EU] is facing” (European Commission, Borders 
and Security, 2013, p. 5). However, the potential gains of the Schengen Agreement have 
been offset by the threat of new competition to the domestic labor markets of the EU-15. 
The tension between the benefits and disadvantages of the labor mobility fostered 
by the Schengen Agreement underscores a paradox present within the European Union: 
member states see the Schengen Agreement as both an opportunity and a hindrance. This 
contradiction is symbolic of the bittersweet experience surrounding the trade and invest-
ment relationship shared between Austria, Germany and the CEE states throughout the last 
few decades. 
German and Austrian FDI in the CEE States Prior to EU Enlargement
Germany and Austria have enjoyed a long tradition of trade and investment with the 
countries of CEE. This can be attributed largely to their geographic proximity. However, 
the extent to which these countries have invested in one another has differed over time. The 
initial spark was the fall of Communism in 1989. This drastic political change was mirrored 
by an equally dramatic economic one within the CEE states—the “transition from a Soviet-
type centrally planned economy to a free market model” proved to be incredibly difficult 
for nearly all CEE states (PWC, 2013, p. 5). For some time, much of CEE experienced 
slow or even negative growth. But the former communist CEE countries soon became the 
“promised land” for foreign investors and attracted much FDI from the West (PWC, 2013, 
p. 5). After 1989, the CEE states collectively saw an unprecedented period of nearly 20 years 
of economic growth—a rate that lasted until the Great Recession of 2008 and was matched 
by few other regions around the globe (Labaye et al., 2013, p. 1). For western investors, 
5	 	The	Schengen	acquis refers to the accumulated set of legislation or requirements necessary to obtain member-
ship in the Schengen Area. 
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Central and Eastern Europe offered an enticing, emerging market of low labor costs, a rela-
tively high-skilled labor force, and a growing consumer population of 100 million people 
(PWC, 2013, p. 5). Additionally, in comparison with the western European economies, the 
“...post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe…were relatively poor and desper-
ate for international investment and capital” (Baun, 2005, p. 373). This provided tremen-
dous potential for both German and Austrian FDI and trade interests. 
Between the two, Austria was quickest to capitalize on the opportunities in the East, 
resulting in a more invested partnership earlier on. By 1999, “Austria’s outgoing [FDI] to 
Eastern Europe accounted for almost 90 % of total investment leaving the country” (Marin, 
2010). Germany, in comparison, moved more slowly. At the end of the 20th century, Ger-
many accounted for only 4 % of the total FDI in Eastern Europe, suggesting that Germany 
took significantly longer to realign its post-communist economic strategy (Marin, 2010). 
However, although the proportion of outgoing German FDI to the CEE states was rela-
tively low, Germany accounted for roughly 20-30 % of foreign investment in the “Visegrad 
Group,”6 by the end of the 1990s (Gross, 2013, p. 30). Thus, in a relatively short amount of 
time, Austria and Germany became the dominant players in the region. 
This investment in CEE proved profitable for several reasons. Primarily, FDI from 
Austria and Germany allowed companies to outsource activities to Eastern Europe, enabling 
them to significantly reduce labor costs by 37 to 73 % (Marin, 2004, p. 16). From 1999-
2000 in Austria and 1996-2000 in Germany, 17 % of Austrian and 45 % of German invest-
ments were “motivated by lower wages in Eastern Europe in which these firms outsource[d] 
labor intensive production stages….” (Marin, 2004, p. 16). The off shoring of production 
accounted for a sizeable portion of German investment in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, and Romania—70 % in comparison to 17 % of Austrian investment in Eastern Eu-
rope in the early 2000s (Marin, 2006, p. 614-615). Gross (2013) notes, that “by the end of 
the 1990s, between 20 and 30 % of the foreign investment flowing into the Visegrad Group 
was German” (p. 30). By investing so heavily in the low cost of labor and high skill offered 
by the CEE states, German and Austrian firms were able to improve their competitiveness 
and productivity in the ever-increasing global and European markets. Estimates suggest that, 
“German off shoring to Eastern Europe boosted not only the productivity of its subsidiar-
ies in Eastern Europe by almost threefold compared to local firms, but it also increased the 
productivity of the parent companies in Germany by more than 20 %” (Marin, 2010). These 
improvements suggest that FDI had a positive impact on Germany and Austria, as well as 
the “host” CEE states. 
German and Austrian FDI was critical to CEE economic growth in numerous ways. 
Germany and Austria helped to foster long-term investment in CEE capital and the coun-
tries’ research and development (R&D), of which the region was found to be wanting 
(Gross, 2013, p. 32). Additionally, German and Austria FDI created new employment op-
portunities. An estimated “190,000 workplaces [were] created in six CEE states by the end 
of 1999 through German FDI specifically seeking lower-cost production” (Wood, 2003, p. 
297). German companies also “created the largest absolute number of university or college 
degree jobs in the Czech and Slovak Republic followed by Poland, Hungary and Russia” 
as well as “a demand of 106,197 skilled workers” (Marin, 2004, p. 36). Likewise, “Aus-
tria’s multinationals [created] a total of 42,233 university graduate jobs in Eastern Europe” 
6	 	The	Visegrad	Group	includes	Poland,	Hungary,	the	Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia.	
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(Marin, 2004, p. 37). This increased demand for and supply of highly skilled laborers sug-
gests an economic interdependence between the regions that was mutually beneficial to 
both the FDI origin countries and the recipient states. 
Attitudes at the Cusp of EU Accession
In the wake of promising investment opportunities in the CEE region arose debates 
surrounding the potential accession of these countries to the European Union. While EU 
enlargement offered a variety of benefits, it nevertheless triggered a host of fears. Compared 
to the EU-15, Germany and Austria found themselves in the most advantageous—and vul-
nerable—positions. Baun (2005) has argued that,
German national interests [favored] enlargement. Economically, Germany stood 
to gain the most from inclusion of the CEECs7 in the EU single market. En-
largement would enhance Germany’s security…. In political terms, Germany’s 
influence within the EU would likely be enhanced by the accession of its Central 
European [neighbors], giving it a group of potential new allies… (p. 377)
For this reason, Baun (2005) suggests that Germany was a natural “advocate” (“Anwalt”) 
for eastern enlargement in the early and middle years of the 1990s (p. 377). Germany also 
anticipated “trade gains of 7.2 %…through enlargement” (Wood, 2003, p. 294). 
There were other economic benefits to EU enlargement. Accession of the CEE states 
into the European Union meant that the region could participate in the EU single market. 
This would directly benefit Austria and Germany by enhancing the relative ease of relo-
cating production from the “old EU-15” to the CEE countries with lower costs of labor. 
Conversely, the membership in the single market offered access to EU financial aid for CEE 
countries (Bandelj, 2010, p. 482). Investor confidence in the area was also predicted to im-
prove as a result of lowered country risks, “because meeting the requirements for admission 
[involved] an external validation of the quality of economic management and institutional 
development” (Bevan & Estrin, 2004, p. 779). CEE accession emphasized an important cor-
relation between EU integration and FDI in the region. A study conducted in 2004 found 
that merely announcing EU accession prospects
[increased] FDI in-flows to countries that [were] evaluated positively. Hence, 
the processes determining EU membership, which [were] based on an evalua-
tion of progress in transition, and announcements concerning potential member-
ship [created] vicious and virtuous circles of growth, EU membership, and FDI. 
Countries that [had] implemented transition policies successfully [were] promised 
relatively speedy EU membership, which further accelerates FDI that generates 
more growth and development. (Bevan & Estrin, 2004, p. 785). 
For CEE countries, membership in the EU also meant a “symbolic acceptance into the 
‘Western world, a completion of the ‘return to Europe’” (Bandelj, 2010, p. 482). This also 
led to improved electoral positions for CEE political leaders as EU membership offered “…
their citizens material benefits, labor mobility to the wealthy West, and the increase in na-
7  Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC)
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tional stature that membership implies’” (Bandelj, 2010, p. 482). 
Yet as discussions about EU enlargement ensued at the turn of the century, dissonance 
began to creep in. While Germany and Austria stood to gain from EU enlargement, “a 
Eurobarometer survey conducted in April/May 2001 indicated 35 % of Germans and 33 % 
of Austrians were in favor of enlarging the EU” (Wood, 2003, p. 289). This suggests that 
although a sizeable portion of their populations was in favor of enlargement, the majority of 
Austrians and Germans were against it.
Fears of Enlargement in the Old EU-15
Opposition to enlargement came in many forms. For example, as the EU-15 began to 
further consider the implications of the CEE states acceding, worries arose over potential 
welfare tourism, displacement of native workers (Doyle, Hughes and Wadensjö, 2006, p. 3; 
31-32), and “prominent negative images [of] mass immigration, job losses and/or lowering 
of [domestic] wages and conditions, an eastern mafia and other less-organized crime, and a 
[diffused] sociocultural intrusion” (Wood, 2003, p. 289). 
While the movement of production was a significant concern, the greater fear was the 
mobility of people. Sharing borders with five of the potential member states from CEE, 
Germany and Austria were particularly vulnerable to migration. The two EU-member states 
already accounted for “two-thirds of the flows of Accession State nationals” before enlarge-
ment (Doyle, Hughes and Wadensjö, 2006, p. 29-30). Thus, governments worried that 
because of low wages and an “average GDP per capita in the Accession States [of] only a 
quarter of the average for the [EU-15]… the income incentive for Accession State nation-
als to migrate [was] strong” (Doyle, Hughes and Wadensjö, 2006, p. 18). With full-fledged 
access to the European Union through Schengen membership—made possible by the adop-
tion of the Schengen acquis—this migration problem would likely be compounded.
Soon, countries like Austria and Germany—which had originally been proponents of 
accession—fell victim to “a domino effect in which Member States who initially said they 
were committed to free movement of [labor] changed their positions as the enlargement 
date of 1 May 2004 approached” (Doyle, Hughes and Wadensjö, 2006, p. 15). In 2003, just 
a year prior to the NMS-10 joining the EU, Wood (2003) reported, “Whether of people or 
goods, full and genuine competitive access has a range of opponents. The general population 
is more inclined to believe that outcomes will be unfavorable than to perceive positive op-
portunities” (p. 289). With a pre-existing paranoia over the influx of migrants to Germany 
and Austria, the response incurred was strict: create a barrier to migration. This meant that 
the only way to control EU accession would be to delay the CEE states’ membership in the 
Schengen Area. 
Policy Response to Enlargement Fears
For Germany and Austria, concerns over enlargement, economic integration, and in-
vestment were all interconnected. Despite this overlap, what tends to be overlooked is that 
the EU-15 enlargement debates and the Schengen acquis were directly connected. As part 
of the rigorous enlargement process, 
 
…the European Commission developed a thorough ‘screening’ of more than 30 
separate policy domains for each of the prospective CEE members…. meeting 
with government officials of each CEE aspirant member and going line by line 
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through the acquis communautaire. (Jacoby & Meunier, 2010, p. 308) 
By extension, the Schengen acquis—which were adopted by this point—would have been 
included in these discussions. Thus, it makes sense that German and Austrian policy re-
sponses to migration and economics were one and the same. Baun (2005) reports that the 
“German government… took a tough position in the accession negotiations on the terms of 
membership of the candidate countries in two special intra-EU arrangements, the Schengen 
agreement… and [the] EMU8” (p. 379). Once restrictions on Schengen were in place, both 
Germany and Austria “made it clear immediately that they would be availing of the transi-
tional arrangements to restrict access to their [labor] markets for the full seven year period” 
for CEE states, extending beyond the date of their initial EU accession (Doyle, Hughes 
and Wadensjö, 2006, p. 17). Although the Austrian and German position on economics 
and enlargement seem to contradict the gains they were set to realize, the logic flows with 
Bandelj’s (2010) theory that, 
States use a variety of measures to regulate, formally and informally, inflows of 
foreign capital. In fact, they seem to be negotiating between the neoliberal logic 
of freely opening borders and providing incentives to foreign capital, on the one 
hand, and adopting economic nationalism and closing borders and discouraging 
foreign investment, on the other hand. (p. 486) 
This would suggest that delaying membership in the Schengen Area was a strategy by which 
Austria and Germany could regulate outgoing FDI while keeping borders shut to the com-
petition from the neighboring CEE countries. 
Additionally, it is important to recognize that there was “‘political resentment’ toward 
FDI” present amongst the CEE states themselves (Bandelj, 2010, p. 489). These countries 
“had just fended off foreign, Soviet, control and were reluctant to have foreigners seek con-
trol of their national assets yet again” (Bandelj, 2010, p. 489). Thus, it makes sense that, “By 
2000, all Central and Eastern European countries had in place protection measures against 
foreign ownership of land (EBRD 2001)” (Bandelj, 2010, p. 489). In their own ways, Aus-
tria, Germany, and the CEE states created barriers by which they could better control the 
threats they perceived to be imposed by furthered economic integration. 
Membership-to-Membership: Managing the Mayhem from 2004 to 2007
With such a surprisingly strong reaction to the CEE member states’ accession, the 
question of how the countries fared remains. Interestingly enough, in spite of the hard 
line drawn by Germany and Austria in the enlargement acquis, some of the greatest growth 
seen in CEE spans from NMS-10 membership in 2004 to their eventual accession to the 
Schengen Area in 2007. Up until the Great Recession of 2008, the FDI flowing into CEE 
“averaged $65 billion a year, or roughly 5 % of the combined GDP of these countries be-
tween 2004 and 2007” (Gross, 2013, p. 32). Medve-Bálint (2014) argues that earlier “studies 
underestimated the volume of FDI inflows as ECE9 foreign capital stock more than tripled 
between 1998 and 2004 and this process did not lose momentum after accession” (p. 38). 
8	 	The	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	(EMU)
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A graph taken from Medve-Bálint’s (2014) calculations of UNCTAD10 data (see Figure 1) 
reflects the enormous, exponential growth experienced at the times of membership in the 
EU (2004) and the Schengen Area (2007), as well as the immediate years following (2011). 
Figure 1
Source: Medve-Bálint (2014), UNCTAD Data
While this unprecedented increase in the value of FDI stock is certainly significant, 
an important point to address is the pre-accession concern of migration. Writing in 2005, 
between EU membership years, Baun argued that a “high flow of workseekers” following 
enlargement was “unlikely because of high structural unemployment in Germany/the EU 
and the expectation of rising demand for labor in entrant countries as income rises…” (p. 
297). From this, Baun insinuated that concerns over delaying the Schengen Area member-
ship were rather superfluous. He predicted “no notable net wandering to the [EU-15,] and 
that transition periods before free access for workers [were] not economically founded” 
(p. 297). Observed trends in migration potentially support Baun’s predictions. As seen in 
Figures 2 and 3, net migration in Austria stabilized around the period of EU enlargements 
(2004-2007). During that time, Germany’s rate of net migration and number of migrants 
significantly decreased. Meanwhile, with the exception of the Czech Republic, rates of 
emigration from the CEE largely leveled out. 
10	 	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	And	Development	(UNCTAD)
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Figure 2
Source: US Census Bureau, International Database
Figure 3
Source: US Census Bureau, International Database
Here remains an important question that deserves further exploration—why did the value 
of FDI stock in CEE increase while migration in the region stabilized? These statistics of 
migration suggest that although fears of migration were legitimate when initially raised, 
concerns over EU enlargement and membership in the Schengen were disproportionately 
inflated. Members of the NMS-10, who once regarded delayed Schengen membership as a 
mark of their marginalization, fared relatively well. 
The paradox of moderate migration and successful FDI stock observed in the CEE 
region following enlargement negotiations may not be a direct result from the decision to 
delay Schengen membership. This correlation has yet to be fully proven. However, the 
action itself reveals that what was perceived as an effort to protect German and Austrian 
interests merely delayed the recognition of a mutually beneficial economic relationship 
shared by Austria, Germany and the CEE states. According to Jacoby and Meunier, by 
Member State 1995 2000 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009
Austria 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 5 2 1 1 1 -1 0
Bulgaria -7 -6 -5 -4 -4 -3 -3
Czech Republic 1 1 2 4 8 7 3
Estonia -9 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Latvia -5 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
Lithuania 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Poland 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
Romania -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Net Migration Rate (per 1000 Population)
Member State 1995 2000 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009
Austria 7 17 16 16 16 15 15
Germany 398 167 82 79 44 -56 -13
Bulgaria -56 -44 -34 -32 -27 -25 -22
Czech Republic 10 7 19 36 84 72 28
Estonia -14 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4
Hungary 21 18 21 25 20 18 16
Latvia -14 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5
Lithuania -2 -1 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
Poland -18 -20 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18
Romania -21 -4 -10 -7 -6 -6 -6
Slovakia 4 1 2 2 2 2 2
Slovenia 3 3 2 2 2 1 1
Net Number of Migrants (in Thousands)
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strategically managing the ‘threats and opportunities” from Central and Eastern Europe, the 
EU-15 “helped organize the CEE region as a complementary platform for firms from exist-
ing member states” to their advantage (Jacoby & Meunier, 2010, p. 308). The barriers to 
entry created by Schengen were unnecessary for protecting German and Austrian economic 
interests, but their ability to replace cultural, political and economic enlargement concerns 
with a structured order of integration enabled complementarity to be truly achieved, albeit 
delayed. 
Conclusion
While the potential benefits to European economic integration are many, the barriers 
are equally considerable. This is evident in the case of German and Austrian FDI in CEE. 
Following the fall of Communism, Austria and Germany actively pursued the economic 
and political interests in Central and Eastern Europe that they viewed as advantageous. 
On a whole, this has benefited both regions greatly. In particular, the Western and CEE 
states have become “mutually dependent on each other… [as] FDI has…transcended the 
east–west divide in Europe” (Medve-Bálint, 2014, p. 47). But the economic and political 
concerns that arose during the EU enlargement negotiations—particularly the worry of 
complete freedom in the movement of people and production—created barriers that de-
layed the potential benefits of this relationship. Perhaps the most deleterious barrier was the 
active decision to delay Schengen membership for the NMS-10 in order to combat fears of 
labor migration. Yet in analyzing the regional outcomes following the enlargements from 
2004 through 2007, it becomes evident that these concerns overshadowed the complemen-
tarity otherwise present. Thus, the gradual accession of the NMS-10 states to the economic 
and political institutions of the EU enabled the burgeoning complementary relationship to 
overcome unwarranted barriers, thereby allowing the advantages of increased integration 
between Austria, Germany, and the CEE region to be more readily realized.
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